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Abstract. This paper aims to examine the relationship between government audit opinion and fraud in local government in
Indonesia. We utilize logistic regression analysis to test the hypothesis using a sample of 28 local governments in West Java
province in periods of the fiscal year 2012 to 2017. This study finds that audit opinion significantly affects the fraud. There is
a strong relationship between audit opinion and fraud. Moreover, the unqualified opinion awarded by The Audit Board of the
Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI) to local government represented the real condition of local governments in their good governance
and accountability. This finding is also robust when we measure fraud by other proxies namely penalty and state-loss. This
study provides a useful suggestion for state audit institution namely BPK RI regarding the importance of regular government
auditing. Follow-up the audit recommendations play an important role in improving internal control effectiveness, accountability,
governance, and transparency. This improvement will reduce the level of fraud in local governments. This study not only fills the
gap of few literature on how to reduce fraud by considering the role of auditing but also measures the important role of government
auditing in reducing and preventing fraud.
Keywords: audit opinion, fraudulent financial statement, local government
Abstrak. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji hubungan antara opini audit pemerintah dan kecurangan di pemerintah
daerah di Indonesia. Kami menggunakan analisis regresi logistik untuk menguji hipotesis menggunakan sampel dari 28
pemerintah daerah di provinsi Jawa Barat pada periode tahun fiskal 2012 hingga 2017. Kami menemukan bahwa opini audit
secara signifikan mempengaruhi kecurangan. Terdapat hubungan yang kuat antara opini audit dan kecurangan. Selain itu,
pendapat Wajar Tanpa Pengecualian yang diberikan oleh Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia (BPK RI) kepada
pemerintah daerah dapat mencerminkan kondisi nyata pemerintah daerah dalam tata kelola dan akuntabilitas yang baik.
Model yang kami kembangkan secara konsisten dapat mengukur kecurangan dengan mengganti variabel dependen menjadi
denda dan nilai kerugian negara. Penelitian ini memberikan saran yang berguna untuk lembaga pemeriksaan negara yaitu
BPK RI tentang pentingnya audit pemerintah yang berkesinambungan. Tindak lanjut rekomendasi audit memainkan peran
penting dalam meningkatkan efektivitas pengendalian internal, akuntabilitas, tata kelola, dan transparansi. Peningkatan ini
akan mengurangi tingkat penipuan di pemerintah daerah. Penelitian ini tidak hanya mengisi kesenjangan beberapa literatur
sebelumnya tentang bagaimana mengurangi kecurangan dengan mempertimbangkan peran audit tetapi juga mengukur peran
audit pemerintah dalam mengurangi dan mencegah kecurangan.
Kata kunci: Opini Audit, Kecurangan Laporan Keuangan, Pemerintah Daerah

INTRODUCTION
The regional government is responsible for realizing the country's goal of achieving a just, developed
and prosperous society as mandated in the opening of
the 1945 Constitution. To achieve this goal, the government plans the work plan of the budget, approves
the regional revenue and expenditure budget together
with the Regional House of Representatives, runs
the regional revenue and expenditure budget, and is
responsible for the implementation of the regional
revenue and expenditure budget in the form of local
government financial reports. In the implementation
of regional revenue and expenditure budgets, local
governments must pay attention to the principles of
regional finances which include accountability, professionalism, proportionality, openness, and financial
audits by independent auditing bodies (Law of The
Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 2003).
Local government financial statements present the

use of regional income and expenditure budget that
has been implemented by the local government in one
fiscal year. Regional governments in implementing
the budget are inseparable from the risks of irregularities in various forms of fraud such as corruption,
bribery, and embezzlement (Law of The Republic of
Indonesia Number 20 of 2001).
To ensure that the government is free from fraud,
the Supreme Audit Board is mandated in Law Number
15 of 2006 concerning the Supreme Audit Board to
examine the management and responsibilities of state
finances which include financial audits, performance
audits, and audits for specific purposes.
The financial audit aims to assess the fairness of
the financial statements which explained in the form
of audit opinion determined by BPK RI (BPK). In
determining audit opinion, BPK consider compliance with government accounting standards, adequate
disclosure, compliance with law and regulations, and
effectiveness of the internal control system.

108

BISNIS & BIROKRASI: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi, September 2020

This study aimed to examine whether the audit
opinion issued by BPK could determine the fraud in
local governments. Most of the fraud detection study
was conducted in the private sectors (Dalnial, et al.
2014; Kaminski, et al. 2004; Kuncoro & Henderson,
2004; McCarten, et al. 2016; Skousen, et al. 2008;
Yu & Yu, 2011). Meanwhile, to the best of our
knowledge, there were limited studies on detecting
fraud in the context of the public sector. Arifin, et al.
(2015) studied whether poor local governance leads
to higher non-compliance cases as a proxy of corruption of local governments in Indonesia. They found
that poor governance of local governments head to
higher non-compliant cases. This result is similar to
the study by Ghazali, et al. (2014). More specifically,
they demonstrated the fewer non-compliant cases in
local government with unqualified audit opinion. In
addition to that, interestingly, they also found that
corruption does not affect economic growth (Arifin
et al., 2015).
Avalon, et al. (2018) analyzed the effect of corruption committed by the district head on BPK audit
opinion. They found a correlation between corruption
committed by district head and BPK Audit Opinion.
Thus, auditors should carefully determine audit opinion based on the fraud found in the audit field whether
to modify the unqualified opinion or not (Avalon et
al., 2018).
Other studies measured the relationship between
audit opinion and fraud in the government institution. Kusuma, et al. (2017) study the influence of
fraud diamond on fraudulent financial reporting of
the public sector. Fraud diamond is consists of pressure, opportunity, rationalization and capability. Audit
opinion variables in this study used as a proxy of
rationalization. They found that audit opinion has no
positive effect on fraudulent financial reporting. After
that, Astuti & Adrison, (2019) study the relationship
between audit opinion and fraud which was proxied
by bribery case. They found unrelated significance
between audit opinion and bribery case because the
bribery is personal type of corruption and was not
documented.
Studies on how to reduce fraud by considering the
role of auditing is still lacking (J. Liu & Lin, 2012).
Moreover, studies in examining the relationship
between government and auditing were still limited
and none of those studies explain the role government
auditing in curbing the corruption (Blume & Voigt,
2011; J. Liu & Lin, 2012; Olken, 2007).
In this study, we measure the effectiveness of
audit opinion in explaining the fraud. Moreover, we
also measured how the audit opinion determined by
BPK able to present the real condition of the local
government. As expected by the public that the local
government’s unqualified opinion means fraud-free
organization. We will examine whether the audit
opinion able to meet public expectations. We will
utilize the fraud case that had been decided by the
court which was not considered in the previous studies
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(Arifin et al., 2015; Avalon et al., 2018; Sutaryo, et al.
2018). Fraud in this study proxied by the fraud case,
the amount of state-loss and the penalty determined
by the court. We focus this study in period of 6 fiscal
years from fiscal year (FY) 2012 to FY 2017 in the
regency, municipal and provincial government in the
scope of West Java province.
We also utilize finance ratios of audited local
government financial statements as the control variables representing the financial condition of local
government in a fiscal year. Financial condition is
the government institutions ability to keep its sustainability in giving service and goods to the public
(Nollenberger, et al. 2003). Financial ratio plays an
important role in measuring the financial condition
of government institutions namely its solvency, independency, flexibility and efficiency. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no previous study utilizing
these set of financial condition ratios. So in this study
we will utilize these variable sets as control variables
in examining the relationship between audit opinion
and fraud.
This study fills the gap in preventing and detecting fraud by measuring the suitability of BPK's audit
opinion with the actual conditions in the regional
government. To prove the ability of audit opinion
in detecting fraud, utilizing the fraud that is legally
binding, we evaluate whether audit opinion reflect
the fraud level of organizations. We measure this
relationship by utilizing financial condition ratios as
control variables. We also utilize two measurements
other than fraud case such as the amount of state-loss
and penalty to make sure the robustness of the model
developed.
In recent years the literature aspect in preventing
and detecting fraud tends to be separately published.
We may find it easier to search for study, research, and
publications related to the investigation and detection
of fraud than the research on how to prevent it. Zack,
(2013) gives solid advice on how to uncover financial
statement fraud schemes. Petrucelli, (2012) has a mission in his book to make learning about fraud both
fun and easy through cartoons, pictures, and humor
to express techniques, tools, and resources to detect
fraud in organizations. Moreover, the theory includes
the steps of a proactive approach in responding to
fraud risk and fraud audit program (Manning, 2011;
Vona, 2008) and utilizing data to digital evidence
(Marcella Jr & Guilossou, 2012).
Most of those works of literature only concern
about the actions of fraud rather than its prevention.
Nevertheless, we still can find literature that discuss
fraud prevention and detection (Biegelman & Bartow,
2012; Kovacich, 2008; Stamler, et al. 2014). So, this
study is not only to try to fill the gap but also provides
the two aspects in one research.
A study on fraud prevention and detection is
becoming more essential in auditing literature as
the fraudster becomes more sophisticated in hiding
the fraud. Local government fraud will lead to huge
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state-loss and decreasing public trust in government
public officials. Fraud will impair efficiency, productivity, and innovation that will make the resource is
not effectively allocated into public services (Ghazali
et al., 2014). In addition, corruption as a scheme of
fraud is a significant problem that harms the economic
development, social stability of many countries (J.
Liu & Lin, 2012) and public dissatisfaction to the
government (Tang, et al. 2018).
Findings show that audit opinion has a significant
relationship with fraud in the scope of West Java province. An unqualified opinion of local government’s
financial statements significantly represents an organization that is free from material fraud and corruption.
This study contributes to the accounting and
auditing literature specifically in fraud prevention
and detection, internal control, and good governance.
Specifically, we contribute to audit literature in exploring the ability of audit opinion reflecting the fraud
level in government organizations. Furthermore, this
study contribute to the literature the role of financial
condition ratio in measuring the relationship between
audit opinion and fraud. This study also contributes
to the better practice of audit institution in improving
the effectiveness of government auditing in reducing
and preventing fraud. the findings of this study are
expected to help policymakers whether their audit
procedures are able to meet the expectation of assignment and public expectation. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows. Hypotheses are developed in the next part before subsequently followed by
sections on research methods, results and discussion,
and conclusion.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Fraudulent financial statement research in the
worldwide context continues to grow, where most
of them focus on fraud cases in private sectors. In
the context of developed country, Kaminski et al.,
(2004) examined the ability of financial ratios in
detecting fraudulent financial reports. They found
the ineffectiveness of financial ratios to detect fraudulent financial statement (Kaminski et al., 2004).
Skousen et al. (2008) fixed high misclassification
rates in Kaminski et al. (2004) using Cressey’s (1953)
framework that comprises of pressure, opportunity
and rationalization adopted from SAS No. 99 to detect
fraud. They found the effectiveness of Cressey’s
(1953) framework in detecting fraud (Skousen et
al., 2008). However, a study in emerging country by
Dalnial et al (2014) shows the relationship between
financial ratio and fraudulent financial statement in
Malaysian firms. They found that financial ratios were
helpful in fraudulent financial statement detection
(Dalnial et al., 2014).
Yu and Yu (2011) examined the relationship
between corporate lobbying and fraud detection. They
found that regulators need a longer time to detect
fraud in lobbying firms. Such delays make the firms
potentially experience greater loss (Yu & Yu, 2011).
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McCarten et al. (2016) also studied the relationship
between corporate lobbying and fraud detection. They
found similar result with Yu and Yu (2012) that lobbying firms were able to hide the misconduct in a longer
time. In addition, McCarten (2016) found that after
2005, lobbying was not impacting the longer duration
in detecting fraud. They argue that the establishment
of SOX rules has effectively reduced the influence
of lobbying companies in hiding fraud for longer
(McCarten et al., 2016).
In the context of the public sector, J. Liu and
Lin (2012) examine the role of China’s government
auditing in corruption control. They found a positive
relationship between fraud detection in audit and corruption levels of local government. Moreover, they
found that the follow up of the audit results is negatively related to the level of corruption. The better a
local government fixes a control weakness that causes
fraud, the lower the level of corruption (J. Liu & Lin,
2012).
Ghazali et al. (2014) conducted a survey to provide
an overview of local government fraud cases in the
context of the Malaysian government. They found that
most fraud cases are misappropriation of funds and
manipulation of accounts. Furthermore, they found
that fraud detected mostly through the auditing process (Ghazali et al., 2014).
In the context of Indonesia, Arifin et al. (2015)
studied whether poor local governance leads to higher
non-compliance cases as a proxy of corruption of
local governments in Indonesia. Using data for 446
municipal/district over 2008 until 2010 period they
find that poor governance head to higher non-compliant cases in both financial distress and non-distress
region. More specifically, they revealed the fewer
non-compliant cases in local government with unqualified audit opinion. Good local governance and strong
internal control system contribute to minimizing the
possibility of fraud committed by a public official
(Arifin et al., 2015).
Fraud detection utilizing the fraud triangle framework by Cressey (1953) was conducted by Maria &
Gudono (2017) in local government in Indonesia.
They modified some proxies of Skousen et al (2008)
so that it may be applied in public sector context.
Pressure proxied by budget performance ratio and the
ratio of regional independence. Opportunities proxied
by the number of Regional Work Unit and population.
Rationalization observed directly from the auditee
responses to the finding, conclusion, and recommendations of the audit report. They focus the study in the
fiscal year of 2013 to 2014 and fraud data in period of
2012 to 2013. Applying factor analysis and then logistic regression they found that Cressey’s fraud triangle
theory had a positive influence on fraud in local governments in Indonesia. Proxies that useful in detecting
the occurrence of fraud are the performance ratio of
the budget, the ratio of local independence and the
number of SKPD, population, the auditee responses
to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
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audit (Maria & Gudono, 2017).
Sutaryo et al (2018), utilizing the fraud triangle
framework of Cressey (1953), tried to detect the fraud
in local government in Indonesia. They used performance accountability and regional income as a proxy
of pressure, e-government, and internal audit capabilities as a proxy of opportunity, and audit result response
and public officials wage as the proxy of rationalization. Applying the multiple linear regression in finding
the effect of performance accountability, regional
income, e-government, internal audit capabilities,
audit response, and public officials wage on corruption in local government in the fiscal year of 2010
to 2013, they found that performance accountability and public official wage have a negative effect
on corruption. Besides that, corruption is positively
affected by audit response. Meanwhile, there is no
relationship between regional income, e-government,
internal audit capabilities and corruption (Sutaryo et
al., 2018).
Furthermore, study in measuring the relationship between audit opinion and fraud in government
institution was limited and conducted with some
approaches. Kusuma, et al. (2017) utilized fraud
diamond framework (fraud triangle + Capability)
to measure the fraudulent financial reporting of the
public sector which is proxied by the BPK audit
opinion. Fraud diamond framework is explaining
the conditions that cause someone to commit fraud.
Fraud diamond consists of pressure, opportunity,
rationalization and capability. In their study, pressure
was proxied by the percentage of budget realization,
opportunity was proxied by income transfers from
the central government and audit findings of internal
control systems, rationalization was proxied by the
previous year non-unqualified opinion and capability
was proxied by changes of the head district. Utilizing
the data of BPK’s audit reports of FY 2014 and FY
2015, they found that pressure factors have a negative
effect on fraudulent financial reporting, while opportunity and capability factors have a positive effect on
fraudulend financial reporting. Meanwhile, pressure
factors that proxied by previous year non-unqualified
opinion have no significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. They argued that field audit instrument
such as an interview with a suspected perpetrator of
fraud is the best way to find the rationalization of
fraud (Kusuma et al., 2017).
In addition, Astuti & Adrison (2019) study the relationship between audit opinion and fraud which was
proxied by bribery case that have been proved and
decided by the Corruption Eradication Commission
(KPK) in the period of FY 2008 - 2017. They found
unrelated significance between audit opinion and
bribery cases because the bribery is personally type
of corruption and was not documented. Furthermore,
they found that the increase of capital expenditures
were significantly affect the bribery case (Astuti &
Adrison, 2019).
The definition of audit quality in the literature of
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classic audit theory is the possibility of auditor will
both discover and report an infringement in the client’s
accounting system (Deangelo, 1981). Government
auditing can improve the transparency of public policies and reduce wasteful spending (Blume & Voigt,
2011; Schelker & Eichenberger, 2010). Olken (2007)
conducted a field experiment to examine the effect of
Indonesia’s government auditing on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects.
They found the negative relationship between the
government auditing and corruption, that the higher
audit frequency will decrease the corruption probability (Olken, 2007). The government auditing by
the state supreme audit institution can prevent government officials from corruption (Li, Miao, & Liang,
2011) and also can reveal corrupt activities in local
government (Ferraz & Finan, 2008, 2010).
The supreme audit institution plays an important
role in conducting the field audit to meet effective
government accountability. The state supreme audit
institution’s mandate, independence, and institutional
environment contribute to the strong influence in their
effectiveness (Blume & Voigt, 2011) supported by the
educational background, experience, and professional
competence of auditors (Shuguang, 2007). Auditors
have an important role in fraud detection and corruption control as they have been familiar with the
financial governance and accounting system (Gong,
2010). These experiences help auditors to discover
and to report a breach.
Corruption is defined as the abuse of public power
for personal interest (J. Liu & Lin, 2012). There is a
well-known proposed model in defining corruption
whereas Corruption equals to monopoly power plus
discretion minus accountability (Klitgaard, 1998). So
that corruption is the combination of the excessive
power of public officials, with a lack of supervision,
and poor accountability. Poor management control
is the main factor that contributes to fraud (Ghazali
et al., 2014).
The findings of irregular and illegal activities in
government auditing conducted by the highly independent and highly technical and impartial of audit
institution, basically is a good reflection of fraud problem in the public financial sector (Ferraz & Finan,
2008; J. Liu & Lin, 2012; Melo, Pereira, & Figueiredo,
2009). Although the audit bodies independence could
be negatively affected by political competition and
frequency of power alternation (Melo, et al. 2009),
corruption cases reveal through the audit process can
affect the results of general elections (Ferraz & Finan,
2008, 2010).
It is expected that the audit opinion as a result
of the financial audit can describe the actual condition of the government in terms of compliance with
government accounting standards, the adequacy of
disclosure, compliance with the law, and the effectiveness of the internal control system. Unqualified
opinion as the best audit opinion given to local government when its financial statement is free from
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material misstatements and fraud. So, the unqualified audit opinion should be a guarantee of a material
fraud-free organization.
Most of the previous study mentioned above was
analyzing the role of auditing in detecting (Ferraz &
Finan, 2008, 2010; Ghazali et al., 2014; J. Liu & Lin,
2012; Maria & Gudono, 2017; Olken, 2007; Sutaryo
et al., 2018) and preventing (Li et al., 2011) the fraud.
To the best of our knowledge, we found only (Arifin
et al., 2015) that found fewer fraud in an unqualified
audit opinion of local government. So, there were limited studies in measuring the ability of audit opinion
in reflecting the level of fraud in local government.
Meanwhile, the best audit opinion namely unqualified
opinion (WTP) is expected to meet the public expectation that able to reflect the free fraud government
organization.
In this study, we will focus our study in measure
the role of audit opinion in reflecting the fraud level of
local governments. As audit opinion is the last examination result of accounting data of local government
financial statement, we will utilize financial ratios of
financial statement to control the relationship between
audit opinion and fraud. We adopt the financial ratios
from study by Ritonga (2014).
Ritonga (2014) developed a formulation to
measure and evaluate the financial condition of government institution. This formulation will be not only
a guidance, but also an early warning system for
local government in evaluating their financial policy.
Financial condition of local government consists of
short-term solvency, budgetary solvency, long-term
solvency, service-level solvency, financial flexibility,
financial independency and regional efficiency ratio
(Ritonga, 2014).
Moreover, Ritonga, 2014 defined the financial
condition terms as follow:
(a)Short-term solvency as the ability of local government to fulfil short-term obligations; (b)Budgetary
solvency is the ability of local government to fulfil
operational obligations; (c)Long-term solvency is
the ability of local government to fulfil long-term
obligations; (d)Service-level solvency is the ability
of local government to supply services and goods to
the public; (e)Financial flexibility is the ability of
local government to get over unexpected events in
the future; (f)Financial independency is the ability
of local government to execute financial rights in
an effective and efficient manner; (g)Regional efficiency ratio illustrates the efficiency of costs incurred
to obtain original regional income.
Specifically, we will use audit opinion declared by
the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPKRI)
and examine its relationship to fraud by utilizing
financial ratios as control variables. Furthermore, this
study will examine the capability of audit opinion
given by BPK to local government in describing the
real condition of local government that should be free
from material misstatement and fraud. Therefore, we
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expect that:
H1: Audit opinion has a negative relationship
with fraud
RESEARCH METHOD
Data and Measurements
This paper utilizes the audit report of financial
statements published by BPK in the scope of West
Java Province. We considering West Java Province
as our object of study not only because of the limited
of manual data collecting from the massive data of
financial report of local government in Indonesia, but
also West Java Province as one of the province that
has the most corruption cases in Indonesia (Avalon
et al., 2018). The object of this study consists of 1
provincial government, 9 municipal governments, and
18 regency governments. The total objects examined
in this study are 28 entities. We focus this study in the
period of six fiscal years (FY) from FY 2012 to FY
2017 in the regency, municipal and provincial government in West Java. Therefore, in total we observe
164 financial reports.
Dependent Variable
We employ several dependent variables to measure
fraud such as whether there is fraud case or not, the
amount of state-loss, and the amount of penalty from
the verdict of the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Indonesia that available on the website of directory
of final decisions https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.
go.id/.
We limit the fraud cases to only cases that have
been proven in court and have been decided by the
judge in the period of FY 2012 to FY 2017. Based
on the verdict of the Supreme Court of the Republic
of Indonesia, we classify the local government as
fraudulent and non-fraudulent local government. The
measurement of fraudulent local government will be
coded by one if the fraud exist and proved, otherwise
zero. This coding based on judge’s decision whether
a fraud defendant must pay a fine and state-loss or
must pay a fine with no state-loss.
More specifically, we used another proxy of fraud
namely state-loss and penalty as a robustness check of
our findings. State-loss and penalty is nominal value
expensed and determined by the court as the effect
of fraud act against the law. The measurement of
state-loss and penalty is the nominal amount that generated from the verdict of the Supreme Court of The
Republic of Indonesia. We define the state-loss referring to Law No. 15 of 2006 concerning the Supreme
Audit Board that stated “State/Regional Losses are
shortages of real, definite and substantial amounts
of money, securities, and goods as a result of unlawful acts intentionally and neglectful." Furthermore,
this definition is elaborated in the explanation of
article 32 paragraph (1) of Law of The Republic of
Indonesia Number 31, (1999) concerning Eradication
of Corruption Crimes stated that what is meant by
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"actually there has been a state financial loss" is a
loss that can be calculated based on the findings
of the authorized agency or accountant designated
public (Law of The Republic of Indonesia Number
20, 2001). Meanwhile, penalty is fines in the form of
monetary nominal value determined by a court judge
for violating regulations or laws.
Table 1. Independent Variables
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Independent Variables
We collect audit opinion data and financial ratios
from BPK Financial Audit Reports on Regional
Government Financial Reports for fiscal year of 2012
to 2017. There are 8 variables and 24 sub-variables
of financial ratios.
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The financial ratio analysis of local governments
variables will adopt the ratio analysis model that
applied by Maria & Gudono (2017), Ritonga, et al.
(2014), and Sutaryo, et al. (2018). Table 3.2 shows
the independent variables used in this study:
To test our hypothesis, we run a logistic panel
regression (Lim, Loh, & Shih, 2000) with model as
follows:

where F is a dummy of one if there is a fraud case
in local governments in a fiscal year collected from
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

the verdict of the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Indonesia, and zero otherwise. Other independent and
control variables are defined in Table 1. For robustness, we also run OLS panel regressions by using state
loss and penalty as alternative fraud measurements
for the dependent variables.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistic of all variables used in this study:
The descriptive statistics result show that the total
observations of this study are equal to 168 objects.
The dependent variable of fraud is a dummy variable
with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of
1. On average, fraud case in the period of FY 2012
to FY 2017 equal to 0.47 that indicates as many as
47% or 79 financial report of local government got
other than unqualified opinion. While the remaining
53% or 89 local government financial reports got an
unqualified opinion. This condition illustrates the high
risk of fraud in the implementation and accountability
of state finances in the province of West Java.
The amount of state-loss in the period of FY 2012
to FY 2017 has a mean value of 303 millions with a
maximum value of 11,900 millions and a minimum
value of 0. The dispersion of state-loss data is high
that showed by the standard deviation that equals to
1,360 millions. This showed a huge amount of stateloss as a result of fraudulent act against the law.
The amount of penalty in the period of 6 fiscal
years has a mean value of 59.2 millions with the maximum value equal to 800 millions and a minimum
value of 0. The standard deviation is high and equal
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to 145 millions which is show the high dispersion in
the amount of penalty of local governments during
FY 2012 to FY 2017.
The amount of penalty in the period of 6 fiscal
years has a mean value of 59.2 millions with the maximum value equal to 800 millions and a minimum
value of 0. The standard deviation is high and equal
to 145 millions which is show the high dispersion in
the amount of penalty of local governments during
FY 2012 to FY 2017.
WTP is a binary variable of audit opinion which
is taking a value of one for local government with an
unqualified opinion report, otherwise zero.
On average, STSA equals to 41.828 means that 1
IDR value of current liabilities guaranteed by 41.8
IDR of current assets. The average value is greater
than the median value showed that the most of local
governments current assets was able to guarantee
their current liabilities. The lowest STSA equals to
0.095 which means current assets is lower than current liabilities. The highest STSA equals to 1,916.82
which is means the relatively better local governments
current assets in guarantee current liabilities.
Budgetary solvency BTSA has the average value
equals to 1.239 means that 1 IDR value of operating
expenditure covered by 1.2 IDR of revenues. The
average value is similar as that of median means
that almost all of the local governments have similar
ability to obtain revenue to cover its operating expenditures supported by low value of standard deviations.
The lowest BTSA equals to 0.089 which is showed
the inability of local government’s revenue to cover
operating expenditures. The highest BTSA equals to
1.677 which is relatively near to average value.
Budgetary solvency BTSA has the average value
equals to 1.239 means that 1 IDR value of operating
expenditure covered by 1.2 IDR of revenues. The
average value is similar as that of median means
that almost all of the local governments have similar
ability to obtain revenue to cover its operating expenditures supported by low value of standard deviations.
The lowest BTSA equals to 0.089 which is showed
the inability of local government’s revenue to cover
operating expenditures. The highest BTSA equals to
1.677 which is relatively near to average value.
LTSC has the average value equals to 0.034 means
that only a few amounts of total assets that financed
by own investment equities or long-term investments.
This average value similar as standard deviation value
and median value that showed almost all of the local
governments has no sufficient investment equities to
acquire assets. As a consequence, the local government has lower ability to meet its long-term liabilities
due to limited long-term investment. The lowest value
equal to zero is caused by some of local governments
with zero value of investment equities. While the
highest value equals to 0.284.
SLSC has the average value equals to 1,685,261
means that in average local governments have more
than enough capability to provide public services and
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goods to people. In serving 1 citizen local government
need cost of 1,685,261 IDR expenditures in form of
public services or goods. The lowest SLSC value
equals to zero is caused by Pangandaran Regency
is new autonomy which was starting its operation
in FY 2014 while the highest SLSC value equals to
4,713,387.
FFLD has the average value equals to 360.362
means that 1 IDR of liabilities covered by 360 IDR
revenue. This value demonstrates a good capability
of local government flexibility to face extraordinary
events, which could either come from internal sources
or be external to the local government organization.
The mean value is higher than the median value
means that most of the local governments had a good
flexibility to face extraordinary events. The lowest
FFLD value equals to 1.46 while the highest value
equals to 17,841.90.
On average, FIDB equals to 0.227 means that 1
IDR of expenditures covered by 0.277 IDR of its own
revenues. This average value is relatively similar as
both value of standard deviation and median. The
lowest FIDB value equals to 0.033 and the highest
values is equals to 1.149. These value shows that
local governments have weak financial independence.
Local governments relied heavily on sources of funding beyond their control or influence and have a high
financial dependency on the central government.
On average, RER equals to 6.171 means that the
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local government needs costs of 6 IDR to generate
1 IDR revenue. This average value is slightly above
that of the median. This finding shows that local
governments are relatively able to generate income
efficiently. The lowest RER value equals to 0.87 while
the highest value equals to 20.1.
The Relationship of Audit Opinion and Fraud
Table 3 shows the regression results for estimating
the relationship of audit opinion and fraud.
This study aimed to investigate the relationship
between the BPK audit opinion and fraud in local
governments. Specifically, we evaluate the effectiveness of the financial audit field in assessing the
financial statement of local government regarding the
compliance with government accounting standards,
adequate disclosure, compliance with law and regulations, and the effectiveness of the internal control
system. It is expected that when local governments
able to meet these four criteria, they will achieve the
goal of state purpose which stated in the opening of
the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This
goal achievement also reflected in good governance,
transparency, accountability, excellent public service,
and free from material fraud. Finally, one of the measurements that represent good governance is audit
opinion declared by BPK. Therefore, we expect that
audit opinion is positively significant related to fraud.
Table 3 presents that audit opinion (WTP) may

Table 3. The Relationship of Audit Opinion and Fraud in West Java Province from FY 2012 to FY 2017

explain the fraud case negatively significant at 1 percent level, consistent with our hypothesis. The WTP
coefficient is negative (-1.106) indicates that the WTP
negatively affect the fraud. Specifically, the fraud
decreases when audit opinion is turn to unqualified
opinion, vice versa. The WTP odds ratio is equals to
0.331 means that when the WTP is changes to unqualified opinion, the odds of fraud decrease by 66,9% (=
1 - 0,331) as compared to non unqualified opinion.
This finding shows that financial statements of local

governments that obtain unqualified audit opinion is
believed free from material misstatement and fraud.
Supporting our hypothesis, using penalty as an
alternative measure of fraud, audit opinion is negatively significant in explaining fraud at 5% level. The
WTP coefficient is negative (-0.969) indicates that
the WTP negatively affect the fraud. Particularly, the
penalty decrease 0.969 billion IDR when audit opinion is change to unqualified opinion. The WTP odds
ratio is equals to 0.379 means that when the WTP is
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turn to unqualified opinion, the odds of fraud decrease
by 62,1% (1 - 0.379) as compared to non unqualified
opinion. The result when using state-loss as the measure of fraud is also aligned with our hypothesis that
WTP may explain the fraud negatively significant at
5% level. The WTP coefficient is negative (-1.129)
indicates that the WTP negatively affect the fraud.
Specifically, the state-loss decrease by 1.129 billion
IDR when audit opinion is change to unqualified opinion. The WTP odds ratio is equals to 0.323 means
that when the WTP is turn to unqualified opinion,
the odds of fraud decrease by 67,7% (= 1 - 0.323) as
compared to non unqualified opinion. In result, we
find that audit opinion significantly affects the fraud.
The results are consistent with Arifin et al. (2015).
The findings extend previous study that found the
significant relationship of the audit process and fraud
(Ferraz & Finan, 2008, 2010; Ghazali et al., 2014; Li
et al., 2011; J. Liu & Lin, 2012; Maria & Gudono,
2017; Olken, 2007; Sutaryo et al., 2018).
Discussion
This study finds that audit opinion significantly
affects the fraud. When a local government accept
an unqualified opinion of their financial statement,
it is illustrating the success of the government in
maintaining good financial governance with better
transparency and accountability. In result they also
able to prevent fraud possibility with effective internal control. This finding aligned with (Avalon et al.,
2018) that the determination of audit opinion taking
into account fraud cases found during the audit field
process.
Based on the findings, the audit opinion declared
by BPK able to reflect the fraud level of local governments. Furthermore, the field audit take an important
role in revealing and preventing fraud in local governments (Ferraz & Finan, 2008, 2010; Ghazali et
al., 2014; Li et al., 2011; Olken, 2007). Specifically,
The BPK has effectively prevented the opportunity
for corruption through issuing recommendations
for improvement and sanctions for any findings of
control weaknesses or findings of non-compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. Based on
these recommendations, the BPK also monitors the
improvement process carried out by the regional government so that it can assist regional governments in
realizing accountable and transparent state financial
governance. Whereas the auditee response to the findings, conclusions and recommendations of audit is
an important variable to prevent fraud in the future
(Maria & Gudono, 2017; Sutaryo et al., 2018). This
evidence also supports the previous study that found
the positive relationship between fraud detected in
audit and corruption level of local government (J.
Liu & Lin, 2012).
Local government compliance in implementing BPK's recommendations on audit findings can
increase the effectiveness of internal control and prevent material fraud. Under these conditions, local
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governments can get the best opinion namely WTP
from the BPK which illustrates the lack of material
corruption cases. Thus, WTP opinion by BPK is in
accordance with the conditions in the field and in
accordance with public expectations that the regional
government is free from material corruption cases
(Arifin et al., 2015; Ferraz & Finan, 2008; J. Liu &
Lin, 2012; Melo et al., 2009).
This study contributed to the literature in revealing the reflection ability of audit opinion declared by
BPK in representing fraud level in local government
institutions. Thus, audit opinion also can take a role
as a fraud detection and prevention. As the previous
study that evaluates the role of auditing to reduce and
to prevent fraud is still scarce (Blume & Voigt, 2011;
J. Liu & Lin, 2012; Olken, 2007). The examination
of audit opinion regarding its ability to represent the
government organization fraud level is still lacking
as well. Furthermore, this study contribute to the literature in utilizing the financial condition ratios to
measure the relationship between audit opinion and
fraud.
Practically, the finding of this study also contributes to the better practice of the audit process
conducted by BPK on evaluating their effectiveness in
revealing and preventing fraud. Audit process starting
from planning such as formulating audit procedures,
conducting the audit procedures, applying audit procedures alternative if needed due to the condition
in field audit, composing audit findings, measuring
the materiality value of fraud, and determining audit
opinion.
So, the audit opinion declared by the BPK seems
to be able to reflect the real condition of fraud level in
local governments. Furthermore, the findings of this
study can provide advice and consideration in determining BPK audit strategies and policies in the future.
This study also shows the ability of audit opinion in
representing the government organization fraud level.
On control variables, The FIDB coefficient is equal
to -2.850 and the FIDB odds ratio is equals to 0.058.
This findings means that when FIDB is rise, the odds
of fraud decrease by 94,2% (1 – 0.058). Moreover,
this study finds that FIDB determines fraud negatively at marginal level, showing the effect of financial
independence on fraud at 90% confidence level.
Besides that, the RER coefficient is equals to -0.170
and the RER odds ratio is equals to 0.843. This findings means that when RER is rises, the odds of fraud
decrease by 15,7% (= 1 – 0,843). Furthermore, RER
negatively affects fraud at 95% confidence level. This
implies the relationship between fraud and regional
efficiency ratio. This finding is not similar with the
previous study by Maria & Gudono (2017) which was
found that the performance ratio of the budget and the
ratio of local independence significantly affects fraud.
Since there were thin previous studies on utilizing the
finance ratio to detect the fraud in the public sector,
our findings contribute to the body of literature in
public sector fraud detections specifically by utilizing
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financial performance conditions.
CONCLUSION
This paper not only supports previous literature
but also complement the previous studies (Arifin et
al., 2015; Avalon et al., 2018; Blume & Voigt, 2011;
Ferraz & Finan, 2008, 2010; Ghazali et al., 2014; Li
et al., 2011; J. Liu & Lin, 2012; Maria & Gudono,
2017; Olken, 2007; Schelker & Eichenberger, 2010;
Sutaryo et al., 2018) by evaluating the relationship
between audit opinion and fraud in local governments.
Specifically, we aim to evaluate the role of government auditing in detecting and reducing fraud in local
governments in the scope of West Java province.
This research examines the relationship between
the audit opinion and fraud in local governments. We
evaluate the ability of audit opinion declared by BPK
in reflecting the real condition level of fraud in local
governments institutions. Does the best audit opinion
represents the free-material fraud in local government
institutions? To answer these objectives research, we
utilize a sample limited to all local governments in
the scope of West Java province that consists of 1
provincial government, 9 municipal governments and
18 regency governments.
We find that local governments audit opinion significantly affects and has a strong relationship with
fraud. This finding show that audit opinion awarded
by BPK to local government able to represent the real
condition of local governments in their good governance, accountability and free from material fraud.
Furthermore, an ongoing audit process is proven
to assist local governments in reducing opportunities
for corruption cases and increasing transparency and
effectiveness with good and accountable governance.
The local government's seriousness in following up on
BPK's findings by implementing BPK's recommendations also contribute to increase the effectiveness
of internal control and prevent fraud in the future.
Finally, Local governments with unqualified opinions
able to maintain their internal control to prevent and
to reduce fraud.
This study provides a useful suggestion for audit
institution namely BPK regarding the importance of
regular government auditing. Furthermore, we underline the importance of monitoring the follow-up of the
audit results in accordance with the recommendations
set by the BPK improved internal control effectiveness, accountable governance and transparency have
proven to be able to reduce the level of corruption in
local governments.
Finally, subject to data availability, future research
can consider exploring the effectiveness of audit
opinion in reducing the fraud in more provinces in
Indonesia. Considering each local government in
all provinces in Indonesia has more diverse characteristics and cultures, future study may add other
sociological dan psychological factors that related
to fraud motivation in a large samples. Besides that,
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exploring a hybrid of public sector financial ratio in
detecting fraud is fruitful agenda research.
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